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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor
DAMAGE SUIT AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS

Another damage suit, in which about $200,000 is sought, is pending against
a firm of accountants. It has not yet been tried and thus the facts have not
been judicially determined but the court had occasion on May 20th to lay
down certain legal principles and to endorse generally the decision in Ultramares
Corporation v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170. The plaintiff, a bank, is suing on the
allegation of deceit. The court was asked to dismiss the case on the written
pleadings or statements by each party without a trial, but it refused to do so
and stated that the damages alleged were not conjectural or speculative and
that the amount could be proved upon a trial of the facts. The facts as
alleged, were as follows:
A certain corporation asked plaintiff for a time loan of $300,000. This was
refused, but plaintiff made a demand loan of this amount and agreed to change
it to a time loan if a certified balance-sheet were furnished which would warrant
a time loan. Defendants certified such a balance-sheet which was presented
to the plaintiff and plaintiff in reliance upon it changed the loan from demand to
time. Defendants in the preliminary move now being discussed claimed that
plaintiff suffered no damage by thus changing the loan in terms but not in
amount.
The court stated that fraudulent misrepresentations which transmute in
decision into a damaging decision connote damages and that one guilty of
making the misrepresentation will not be permitted to say what the one de
frauded would or would not have done, or that the innocent might have suf
fered damage if the fraud had not been concocted or no deception had been
practised. It may fairly be assumed that the one deceived would have acted
for his own protection had the expected truth been told instead of the false
statement upon which reliance was placed. The court then quoted from the
Ultramares case: “Where a person within whose special province it lay to know
a particular fact has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made with regard
to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determining
his course accordingly, he has been held bound to make good the assurance he
has given.”
While no presumption of damage arises from a representation proved to be
false, the nature of the representation may be such that injury from acting
upon it may be inferred. In the latter category, it would seem, said the court,
“is the representation here allegedly, recklessly and wantonly made in the
financial statement of a corporation certified for correctness by the defendants,
certified public accountants, to induce action by the plaintiff bank. The
damage claimed is $197,561.27, the difference between the amount loaned and
the amount received by plaintiff as dividends upon the distribution in bank
ruptcy of the borrowing corporation’s estate.”
This case raises an interesting question of law. Was the plaintiff damaged,
notwithstanding the sum was actually lent before the balance-sheet was
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certified, by the change of the loan into one for a fixed period of time and by
plaintiff’s surrender of the demand note and its right to proceed for collection
at any time it thought proper? This difficulty is an apt vindication of the
judgment of the seniors at Yale who, according to The New Yorker for May
27, 1933, voted accounting the “hardest subject.”
TAX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHAIN STORES

Social and political reformers have often found taxation a ready weapon with
which to fight those who disagree with them, just as the federal government has
found it convenient to incarcerate offenders against income-tax laws when there
was at least a suspicion that the men concerned had committed more serious
offenses. Thus by indirection do we seek direction out. The curbing of chain
stores has been sought through prohibitive taxation. The United States
supreme court has recently laid down certain principles of law to be observed
in such efforts, Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo dissenting in part. The
case before the court was Liggett Co. v. Lee, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, which involved a
Florida statute. That law levied a tax on the privilege of conducting retail
stores within the state. The tax was to increase with the number of stores
operated by the same owner and it was to increase further if the stores were
located in more than one county. Merchandise carried by retail merchants
was to be taxed at a higher rate than merchandise carried by wholesalers.
This statute was attacked on the ground that its method of discriminating was
in violation of the constitutional guaranty of equal protection. The court
held that wholesalers could be treated differently from retailers and that chain
stores could be singled out for taxation but that the discrimination between
those operating in one county and those operating in more than one county
was arbitrary and thus violative of the equal protection principle established
by the constitution.
DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

“Directors should direct,” writes Mr. Justice Black of the New York su
preme court as the first words of his opinion in Irving Trust Co., trustee in
bankruptcy of International Match Corp'n v. Allen et al., 89 N. Y. Law Journal
3375 (June 5, 1933). This action was brought against seven directors of the
corporation on an allegation that the directors had unlawfully abdicated,
delegated and surrendered their powers and duties to Mr. Kreuger when his
interests were adverse to those of the corporation, whereby the corporation
incurred losses. Six of the defendants immediately asked the court to dismiss
the action without a trial, on the ground that the plaintiff in its complaint,
that is, the written allegations upon which the action was based, had failed to
state a cause of action against them. Defendants’ motions to dismiss were
denied because the court decided that plaintiff’s allegations of nonfeasance and
misfeasance were legally sufficient to raise issues to be proved on a trial.
Judge Black’s opinion contains much sound advice for corporate directors.
Although legal remedies against directors today are almost wholly statutory,
there never has been a time when a legal remedy did not exist against directors
who neglected their duties and did not direct. Directors are personally liable
if they permit corporate funds or property to be lost or wasted because of their
negligence or inattention to their duties. The basis for this responsibility is
the trust relation which they bear to the corporation and its stockholders. A
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director is bound to exercise the same degree of care in the performance of his
duty that a man of common prudence generally shows in his own affairs. The
law has no place for dummy directors. As was pointed out in Walker v.
Man, 142 Misc. (N. Y.), 277, “Passivity and disavowal of knowledge alone do
not constitute a pass to freedom from responsibility. A director may not
shut off liability by shutting off his hearing and sight.” And a Tennessee
court has said that culpable negligence is the equivalent of fraud (Shea v.
Mabry, 1 Lea, Tennessee, 319, 342). A director may be liable for negligence
in allowing wrongful acts to be committed after he becomes a director although
the resolutions authorizing such wrongful acts had been adopted prior to his
election. Even the employment of professional accountants will not always
relieve directors from their duty to inform themselves as to the true condition
of the corporation’s affairs (Tri-Bullion Smelting Co. v. Corliss, 186 App. Div.
(N. Y.), 613, affirmed in 230 N. Y. 629).
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